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23 
THE DEPARTMENT THAT CRIED WOLF: 
TENTH CIRCUIT VACATES PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION IN ABSENCE OF LIKELY 
INJURY IN NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF 
GAME & FISH v. UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
Abstract: In the 2017 case, New Mexico Department of Game & Fish v. United 
States Department of the Interior, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish (“New 
Mexico Department”) was not entitled to a preliminary injunction that barred the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service from releasing endangered Mexican gray 
wolves into the wild on federal lands within New Mexico. The Tenth Circuit held 
that the New Mexico Department did not show that irreparable injury to its wild-
life management efforts or its state sovereignty was likely. The Tenth Circuit also 
departed from other circuits’ use of a modified, “sliding-scale” preliminary in-
junction test, instead interpreting the United States Supreme Court’s 2008 deci-
sion in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“Winter II”) as invali-
dating the continued use of sliding-scale tests. This Comment argues that the 
Tenth Circuit was correct in rejecting sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests 
and instead requiring that moving parties demonstrate, at a minimum, that all 
four factors of the traditional test are met. Further, this Comment contends that 
other jurisdictions should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach of emphasizing like-
ly irreparable injury as the most important prerequisite to preliminary relief.  
INTRODUCTION 
Once common throughout the southwestern United States, the Mexican 
gray wolf was all but eliminated from the wild by the 1970s due to hunting and 
eradication methods by humans.1 Acting pursuant to the Endangered Species 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 854 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 
2017) (discussing gray wolf eradication and subsequent recovery efforts in the United States). By the 
1930s, wolves were almost entirely erased from the lower forty-eight states due to one of the most 
effective eradication campaigns in modern history. Id. at 1239–40. These extermination efforts, initi-
ated by government programs and private individuals, primarily sought to decrease loss of livestock 
from wolf predation by means which included trapping, shooting, and poisoning of wolves, as well as 
digging pups out of dens. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Jewell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 69, 81 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(quoting Hope M. Babcock, The Sad Story of the Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf Reintroduction 
Program, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 38 (2013)); WildEarth Guardians v. Ashe, No. CV-15-
00019-TUC-JGZ, 2016 WL 3919464, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2016) (citing Endangered and Threat-
24 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
Act of 1973 (“ESA”), the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) 
initiated drastic recovery efforts to conserve the various wolf subspecies in the 
United States in 1977.2 Nevertheless, by 2015, there were only ninety-seven 
Mexican gray wolves left in the wild, setting the stage for future federal-state 
governmental conflicts over wildlife management.3 
The legal control of wildlife has historically been governed by the indi-
vidual states where the wildlife is located.4 Yet, in situations involving endan-
gered species, such as the Mexican gray wolf, state and federal priorities re-
garding wildlife management are often in conflict.5 This constant tension al-
lows even judicial procedural determinations, such as whether to grant a pre-
liminary injunction, to expose challenges in balancing substantive legal princi-
ples, such as federal supremacy, the public trust doctrine, and federalism.6 
                                                                                                                           
ened Wildlife and Plants; Revision to the Regulations for the Nonessential Experimental Population of 
the Mexican Wolf, 80 Fed. Reg. 2512 (Jan. 16, 2015) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 17)). 
 2 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012) (providing federal agen-
cies various means of conserving threatened and endangered wildlife); Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife and Plants; Revision to the Regulations for the Nonessential Experimental Population of the 
Mexican Wolf, 80 Fed. Reg. 2512, 2517 (summarizing wolf recovery statistics). 
 3 What You Need to Know: The Mexican Gray Wolf, EARTHJUSTICE (Jan. 30, 2018), http://earth
justice.org/features/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-mexican-gray-wolf [https://perma.cc/RLN6-
N5S7] (providing that wild Mexican gray wolves totaled only 113 in February 2017); see Biological 
Report for the Mexican Wolf, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. SW. REGION (Nov. 2017), https://
www.fws.gov/southwest/es/mexicanwolf/pdf/2017MexicanWolfBiologicalReportFinal.pdf (providing 
Mexican gray wolf numbers and recovery efforts as of November 2017); see also N.M. Dep’t of Game 
& Fish, 854 F.3d at 1242, 1243 (explaining that the FWS and New Mexico worked collaboratively 
until 2011). 
 4 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) (recognizing a state’s right to regulate wild-
life). But see Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (overruling Geer on other grounds); 
Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1459, 
1460 (discussing court recognition of state sovereign ownership of wildlife). The state ownership 
doctrine provides that states “own” the wildlife that exists within their state. See Blumm & Paulsen, 
supra. 
 5 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Mod-
els, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1141, 1144 (1995) (explaining the balance of power between federal and 
state governments in wildlife and natural resources management). 
 6 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. (Winter II), 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (reversing a lower 
court’s preliminary injunction against the United States Navy for its use of sonar that potentially af-
fected nearby marine mammals); N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1256 (reversing a lower 
court’s preliminary injunction that barred the FWS from releasing Mexican gray wolves on federal 
land in New Mexico). The doctrine of federal supremacy, as provided by the U.S. Constitution’s Su-
premacy Clause, establishes that the U.S. Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties 
made under its authority, constitute the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Stephanie 
Jurkowski, Supremacy Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST. (June 2017), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
supremacy_clause [https://perma.cc/D99B-LRX4]. The public trust doctrine refers to sovereign con-
trol over, and responsibility for, natural resources, which are held in trust by the government for the 
people. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474–83 (1970). Federalism in the United States is the constitutional 
relationship, including the division of authority and function, between and among the national gov-
ernment and the various state governments. George Charles Roche III, American Federalism: Origins, 
2018] Tenth Circuit Vacates Preliminary Injunction in Absence of Likely Injury 25 
In the 2008 case Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
(“Winter II”), the United States Supreme Court held that a preliminary injunc-
tion is an extraordinary remedy that requires a clear showing that the movant is 
entitled to such relief.7 Further, the Court held that to warrant preliminary re-
lief, moving parties must demonstrate that irreparable injury absent an injunc-
tion is likely, not merely possible.8 Since Winter II, the federal circuit courts of 
appeals have been inconsistent in their relative emphases on the likely irrepa-
rable injury requirement and in interpreting the continued validity of modified, 
“sliding-scale” preliminary injunction tests.9 For example, the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth Circuits interpret Winter II to inval-
idate sliding-scale tests.10 In contrast, the United States Courts of Appeals for 
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits continue to apply sliding-scale tests 
that relax, or completely ignore, one factor’s required showing upon a moving 
party sufficiently demonstrating either that the other three factors exist or that 
one factor is especially strong.11 
In the 2017 unanimous panel decision in New Mexico Department of 
Game & Fish v. United States Department of the Interior, the Tenth Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Dec. 1, 1966), https://fee.org/articles/american-federalism-origins/ [https://
perma.cc/8WMU-92TJ]. 
 7 Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; see also Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 
356 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that “because ‘a preliminary injunction is an extraordi-
nary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal’”) (quoting SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa 
USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991)). A movant is a party who makes a motion, such as 
for a preliminary injunction, to a court. Movant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 8 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22. 
 9 See id. Compare N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246 (invalidating modified, sliding-
scale preliminary injunction tests), and Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 
F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the use of any type of modified test), with All. for the Wild 
Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the sliding-scale, “serious 
questions” test), and Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that preliminary 
injunction factors are interdependent and must be balanced), and Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG 
Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent does not bar its modified test because the Court never expressly rejected such sliding-
scale tests). A modified test is an approach that differs from the traditional standard, which requires 
that all factors are sufficiently and independently met. See N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 
1246. A sliding-scale test is a type of modified test that treats the preliminary injunction factors as 
relative by relaxing (or completely ignoring) the burden for movants to show one factor upon a suffi-
ciently strong showing of one or more other factors. See id. 
 10 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246 (invalidating sliding-scale preliminary injunc-
tion tests); Real Truth About Obama,575 F.3d at 347 (rejecting the use of the modified test); see Win-
ter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (requiring that a movant for a preliminary injunction demonstrates that irrepara-
ble injury is likely). 
 11 See All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131–32 (applying the sliding-scale, “serious ques-
tions” test that relaxes the burden to show other factors upon sufficiently demonstrating that serious 
questions regarding the adverse party’s conduct are present); Quinn, 612 F.3d at 546 (holding that 
preliminary injunction factors are interdependent and must be balanced against each other); Citigroup 
Glob. Mkts., 598 F.3d at 38 (holding that U.S. Supreme Court precedent does not bar its modified 
sliding-scale test because the Court never expressly rejected such tests). 
26 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
vacated a preliminary injunction granted by the United States District Court for 
the District of New Mexico against FWS’s release of Mexican gray wolves 
onto federal land in New Mexico.12 Following the release of two wolves with-
out a state permit, the federal district court’s order preliminarily enjoined the 
FWS from importing or releasing any additional wolves into the state without 
a state permit.13 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the injunction and held 
that the New Mexico Department did not demonstrate that FWS’s release of 
wolves would likely and irreparably harm the state’s wildlife management ef-
forts or impact its state sovereignty.14 
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit’s holding in New Mexico De-
partment of Game & Fish correctly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Winter II as rejecting sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests.15 This 
Comment further contends that other jurisdictions should follow the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s approach of requiring a heightened showing by moving parties that ir-
reparable injury is likely absent preliminary relief.16 Part I of this Comment 
gives an overview of the preliminary injunction standard, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2008 decision in Winter II, and the Tenth Circuit’s 2017 holding in 
New Mexico Department of Game & Fish.17 Part II discusses the split among 
the federal circuits as to the proper preliminary injunction standard since Win-
ter II, especially regarding the validity of sliding-scale approaches and the re-
quired emphasis on the likely irreparable harm factor.18 Part III argues in favor 
of the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Winter II as invalidating sliding-scale 
approaches and that each factor must instead be sufficiently and independently 
shown.19 Part III also contends that that the Tenth Circuit’s emphasis on the 
likely irreparable injury factor is consistent with Winter II.20 This Comment 
concludes by suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt the Tenth 
Circuit’s preliminary injunction approach.21 
                                                                                                                           
 12 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1256. 
 13 Id. at 1244–45. 
 14 See id. at 1254–56. 
 15 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (reversing a preliminary injunction because the lower courts im-
properly relaxed the requirement to show likely irreparable harm absent relief); N.M. Dep’t of Game 
& Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246 (holding sliding-scale tests as invalid after Winter II and reversing district 
court’s grant of a preliminary injunction where no likely irreparable injury was shown). 
 16 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (holding the “possibility” standard as too lenient); N.M. Dep’t of 
Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1249–50 (requiring movants show the injury is “of such imminence that 
there is a clear and present need for equitable relief”). 
 17 See infra notes 221622–85 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 86–113 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 114–125 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 126–133 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. 
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I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD AND 
NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF GAME & FISH 
Courts often disagree over the preliminary injunction standard, especially 
when state, federal, and nongovernmental interests conflict over management 
of wildlife.22 Section A of this Part examines the development of the prelimi-
nary injunction standard and the different approaches taken by federal courts 
of appeals.23 Section B describes federal and state roles in wildlife manage-
ment and summarizes Mexican gray wolf reintroduction efforts in the United 
States.24 Section C details the factual background, procedural history, and 
holding of New Mexico Department of Game & Fish v. United States Depart-
ment of the Interior.25 
A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard 
A party moving for a preliminary injunction must demonstrate four ele-
ments to obtain a preliminary injunction.26 First, the movant must show that 
they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits.27 Second, the movant 
must show they will likely suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is de-
nied.28 Third, the movant’s threatened injury must outweigh the injury the op-
posing party will suffer if the injunction is granted.29 Fourth, the injunction 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246 (applying traditional four-part test in case 
seeking an injunction against the FWS’s release of Mexican gray wolves in New Mexico); Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter (Winter I), 518 F.3d 658, 677 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying sliding-scale test 
in case seeking an injunction against the U.S. Navy’s use of sonar that possibly harmed marine mam-
mals), overruled by Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; Percival, supra note 5, at 1141, 1144 (discussing how 
responsibilities for environmental policy are allocated between federal, state, and local governments). 
 23 See infra notes 26–44 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 58–85 and accompanying text. 
 26 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010); Winter II, 555 U.S. at 
20; N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246; Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 723 (10th Cir. 
2016). A preliminary injunction is a temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent an 
irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance to decide the case. Preliminary Injunc-
tion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 27 Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. at 156; Winter II, 555 U.S. at 20; N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 
F.3d at 1246; Kobach, 840 F.3d at 723. 
 28 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246; Kobach, 840 F.3d at 723; see Monsanto Co., 
561 U.S. at 156; Winter II, 555 U.S. at 20; 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. 
CIV. § 2948.1, at 139 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that a presently existing and actual threat, and not merely a 
speculative injury, must be demonstrated to warrant a preliminary injunction). But see WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra § 2948.1, at 195 (acknowledging that a preliminary injunction only requires a movant to 
demonstrate a strong threat of injury before trial, but not necessarily a certainty that such injury will 
occur). 
 29 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246; Kobach, 840 F.3d at 723; see Monsanto Co., 
561 U.S. at 157; Winter II, 555 U.S. at 20. 
28 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
must not be adverse to the public interest.30 The United States Supreme Court 
has held that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy 
that should not be granted unless the movant carries the burden of persuasion 
by a clear showing.31 Courts often consider the showing of likely irreparable 
harm as the most important prerequisite for preliminary injunction, and there-
fore require that movants first demonstrate that element exists before the others 
are even considered.32 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 ruling in Winter II, parties mov-
ing for preliminary injunctions often argued for a “sliding-scale,” test to ap-
ply.33 Courts applying such sliding-scale tests would relax, or “slide,” the bur-
den for movants to demonstrate one factor upon a sufficiently high showing of 
another factor.34 For example, courts conducted this balancing approach by 
relaxing the movant’s burden to show likelihood of success either when the 
other three elements were met or when there were questions going to the mer-
its so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful that they made issues ripe for 
litigation.35 Before Winter II, federal courts also applied conflicting standards 
                                                                                                                           
 30 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246; Kobach, 840 F.3d at 723; see Monsanto Co., 
561 U.S. at 157; Winter II, 555 U.S. at 20. 
 31 See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades of 
Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split Over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1026–27 
(2012) (explaining the circuit split over the proper preliminary injunction standard following the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in Winter II). 
 32 See Dominion Video, 356 F.3d at 1260 (emphasizing preliminary injunction movant’s require-
ment to show likely irreparable harm); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 2948.1, at 195 (noting that 
“[p]erhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a 
demonstration that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a deci-
sion on the merits can be rendered”); see also Port City Props. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 518 F.3d 1186, 
1190 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that because courts consider demonstrating likely irreparable harm as 
the most important prerequisite, the moving party must demonstrate this factor before the others will 
be considered). 
 33 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (not addressing sliding-scale tests directly, but reversing prelimi-
nary injunction due to lack of clear showing of likely irreparable harm); N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 
854 F.3d at 1246 (discussing previously-applied “serious questions” sub-approach of sliding-scale 
test, and invalidating such modified tests after Winter II); Winter I, 518 F.3d at 677 (applying sliding-
scale test that relaxed movant’s burden to show “likely irreparable harm” factor when the movant 
sufficiently demonstrated the other factors). 
 34 See N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246; Winter I, 518 F.3d at 677; Weisshaar, supra 
note 31, at 1037, 1038. The term “slide” describes the relaxing of the burden to demonstrate one factor 
upon a stronger showing of another. See id. at 1037. 
 35 See Walmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying a modified 
“likelihood of success” test that relaxed the requirement to show that factor where the other three were 
shown and there existed “serious questions” going to the merits of the case); see also N. Nat. Gas Co. 
v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 697 F.3d 1259, 1266 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that where the three latter harm 
factors weigh in favor of the movant, the probability of success factor is relaxed). Referred to by mul-
tiple federal circuits as the “serious questions test,” this sub-approach made issues worthier of deliber-
ate investigation because the burden to show all four factors is reduced. See Walmer, 52 F.3d at 854. 
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for the irreparable injury requirement.36 For example, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that injury had to be both certain and 
great, and not merely serious or substantial.37 In contrast, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit required the plaintiff show only a “pos-
sibility” of irreparable harm.38 
In 2008, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter (“Winter I”), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary 
injunction granted by the United States District Court for the District of South-
ern California against the United States Navy.39 The preliminary injunction, 
which barred the Navy from using mid-frequency sonar off the coast of South-
ern California, was based only on a possibility that the sonar irreparably 
harmed marine mammals in the geographic vicinity of the Navy’s operations.40 
Hoping to resolve the confusion over the irreparable injury standard, in Winter 
II in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit erred by affirming the lower court’s preliminary injunction.41 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a movant seeking preliminary relief must 
demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely, not just possible.42 Nevertheless, 
the Court’s majority opinion in Winter II did not address the continued validity 
of the Ninth Circuit’s sliding-scale test that relaxed the requirement to show 
one element upon sufficient showing of another.43 As a result, disagreement 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (holding that mere “possibility” of harm standard was inade-
quate); Winter I, 518 F.3d at 696 (granting preliminary injunction where Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. only alleged a possibility that the U.S. Navy’s sonar would irreparably harm marine 
mammals); Dominion Video, 356 F.3d at 1262 (holding that to meet the irreparable harm requirement, 
the injury “must be both certain and great . . . [not] merely serious or substantial”) (quoting Prairie 
Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 37 Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, 253 F.3d at 1250 (holding that a Native American tribe 
demonstrated the irreparable harm requirement because, absent an injunction, Kansas’s motor vehicle 
registration requirements would cause the tribe injury that could not be remedied with money); see 
also Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that movant must 
show that injury complained of is “of such imminence that there is clear and present need for equita-
ble relief”); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that the injury must be likely to occur before the district court rules on the merits). 
 38 See Winter I, 518 F.3d at 696 (requiring the plaintiff show only a “possibility” of irreparable 
injury when it preliminarily enjoined the U.S. Navy from using mid-frequency sonar that possibly 
harmed marine mammals off the southern coast of California). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 661, 696. The federal district court’s analysis in granting the Natural Resources Defense 
Council’s (NRDC’s) motion for a preliminary injunction against the U.S. Navy was primarily focused 
on the NRDC’s probability of success on the merits at trial. See id. at 661. 
 41 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22. 
 42 See id. 
 43 Id. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s opinion should not be construed 
as rejecting flexible “sliding-scale” approaches); see id. at 22 (majority opinion) (emphasizing im-
portance of irreparable harm prerequisite, but not discussing validity of sliding-scale tests). 
30 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
persists over both the validity of sliding-scale tests and the relative emphasis 
on the likely irreparable injury factor among the other three factors.44 
B. Federal and State Roles in Wildlife Management and Mexican  
Gray Wolf Reintroduction Efforts 
In the United States, the individual states and the federal government share 
authority in managing wildlife.45 Although this current balance creates opportu-
nities to coordinate state and federal laws to better protect wildlife, the overlap 
of powers often instead creates tension between the levels of government over 
their differing wildlife management priorities.46 At the state level, the New Mex-
ico Department of Game and Fish (“New Mexico Department”) is the govern-
ment agency of New Mexico responsible for maintaining wildlife and fish in the 
state.47 At the federal level, the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”) 
is the federal executive department responsible for management and conserva-
tion of about seventy-five percent of federal public land and natural resources.48 
The FWS is the agency within the Department of the Interior responsible for 
enforcing federal wildlife laws and protecting endangered species.49 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Compare Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 
2016) (invalidating sliding-scale tests), with id. at 1287 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (supporting more flexible, sliding-scale approach used by other federal circuits). 
 45 See Phillip M. Kannan, The 2009 Colorado State of the Rockies Report Card, U.S. LAWS & 
POLICIES PROTECTING WILDLIFE 76, 76–78 (2009), https://www.coloradocollege.edu/dotAsset/
fc919f40-c24a-4287-ab6c-d649e4dca7a6.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2UD-LAJ3] (discussing state and 
federal authority to manage wildlife in the United States). The federal government uses its authority 
under the interstate commerce clause and the property clause to enact laws protecting wildlife. See id. 
at 76. Any state law in conflict with such federal laws will be invalid under the supremacy clause. See 
id. at 77. States assert state ownership of wildlife through the public trust doctrine and their police 
power to enact laws to protect wildlife. See id.; see also Michael O’Loughlin, Note, Understanding 
the Public Trust Doctrine Through Due Process, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1321, 1324 n.21 (2017) (citing In re 
Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980)) (claiming that state and feder-
al governments have an obligation to protect wildlife). 
 46 Percival, supra note 5, at 1141, 1143. But see Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1, 18 (2011) (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency shows much greater deference to 
state interests than other federal agencies). 
 47 Who We Are, N.M. DEP’T GAME & FISH (2016), http://www.wildlife.state.nm.us/home/
contact/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/4XKZ-R6DP]. The New Mexico Department of Game and Fish 
protects, conserves, and regulates the use of game and fish to ensure there is an adequate supply for 
recreation and food. See id. 
 48 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-223, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: OB-
SERVATIONS ON A POSSIBLE MOVE OF THE FOREST SERVICE INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERI-
OR (2009); About, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.doi.gov/whoweare [https://
perma.cc/UP6K-BKUX]. 
 49 See About the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Mar. 24, 2016), 
https://www.fws.gov/help/about_us.html [https://perma.cc/26SW-N62R]. The FWS is dedicated to 
managing and protecting fish, wildlife, and natural habitats for future generations of Americans. See 
id. This Comment refers to Federal Appellants (FWS, DOI, and Intervenor Appellants) collectively as 
“FWS.” See id. 
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The FWS has authority to reintroduce certain endangered species onto 
federal lands under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”).50 The ESA 
directs the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”), acting through the FWS, to 
classify species whose survival is in question as either “endangered” or 
“threatened,” as well as to promulgate regulations listing those species as such 
and to designate their critical habitat.51 If a species is given either classifica-
tion, the ESA requires the Secretary to develop and implement “recovery 
plans” to aid the species’ conservation and survival.52 
The North American gray wolf has long been a major focus of the move-
ment to conserve endangered wildlife.53 By the 1930s, wolves were almost 
entirely eliminated from the lower forty-eight states due to one of the most 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). Congress enacted the ESA to provide various means of 
conserving endangered and threatened species and their ecosystems. See id. § 1531(b); Determination 
That Two Species of Butterflies Are Threatened Species and Two Species of Mammals Are Endan-
gered Species, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,736, 17,737 (Apr. 28, 1976) [hereinafter Determination that Species 
Are Threatened and Endangered] (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (listing Mexican gray wolves as en-
dangered). 
 51 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1533, 1538(a) (providing methods for determining “threatened” and 
“endangered” statuses of species and to protect an conserve such species); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (stating the ESA’s provisions mandating that federal agencies “‘conserve’ [a 
species includes] . . . ‘the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endan-
gered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chap-
ter are no longer necessary’”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(2)); Fish and Wildlife 
Service, FED. REG. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/fish-and-wildlife-service 
[https://perma.cc/QR8Q-2K4Z] (describing the placement of the FWS in the Department of the Interi-
or); Endangered Species: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Jan 3, 2018), http://www.fws.
gov/endangered/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/5DA5-5ULB] (explaining that the goals of con-
serving an endangered species includes the pursuit of its recovery); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (de-
fining “threatened”); 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (defining “endangered”). A species is deemed “endan-
gered” if it is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range, and a species 
is “threatened” if it is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1532(6), (20); see What Is the Difference Between Endangered and Threatened?, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV. (Mar. 2003), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/tvs-e.pdf [http://perma.
cc/XW23-XSR2] (explaining that endangered species are species that are at the brink of extinction 
now). The ESA defines critical habitat as the endangered or threatened species species’ specific geo-
graphic area, or closely outside the geographic area, on which are found those physical or biological 
features essential to the conservation of the species and which may require special management con-
siderations or protection. 16 U.S.C. § 1532. 
 52 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1). In order to avoid possible conflict between state and federal agen-
cies, the ESA requires the Secretary to fully cooperate with states whenever possible. See id. 
§ 1535(a); N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1248. In accordance with the ESA, the Secretary 
issued one of the regulations at issue in this case. See 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(i)(5)(i); N.M. Dep’t of Game & 
Fish, 854 F.3d at 1248. One regulation requires that: “(i) Federal agencies of the department of the 
interior shall: . . . . (5) Consult with the States and comply with State permit requirements in connec-
tion with the activities listed below, except in instances where the Secretary of the Interior determines 
that such compliance would prevent him from carrying out his statutory responsibilities: (i) In carry-
ing out . . . programs involving reintroduction of fish and wildlife . . . .” 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(i)(5)(i); see 
also 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (providing guidance when state and federal laws conflict). 
 53 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1240. 
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effective eradication campaigns by humans in modern history.54 As a result, 
the smallest, rarest, and southernmost subspecies of the gray wolf, the Mexican 
gray wolf, was almost completely extirpated by 1970.55 In 1976, the Mexican 
gray wolf was first listed as endangered under the ESA.56 After capturing the 
last remaining wild Mexican wolves, the United States and Mexico partnered 
to initiate the Mexican Wolf Species Survival Plan, which strives to prevent the 
extinction of the subspecies by breeding the wolves in captivity and releasing 
them into the wild.57 
C. The Tenth Circuit Addresses Preliminary Injunctions in New Mexico 
Department of Game & Fish v. United States Department of the Interior 
New Mexico collaborated with FWS to conserve the Mexican gray wolf 
until 2011, when the New Mexico Department began requiring that FWS re-
ceive state permits before releasing or importing any more wolves within New 
Mexico’s borders.58 The FWS filed two permit applications with the New 
Mexico Department in April and May 2015, seeking to import a family of 
Mexican gray wolves into the state for release onto federal land.59 In June 
2015, the Director of the New Mexico Department (“Director”) denied both 
permit applications, claiming that the New Mexico Department could not de-
termine whether federal releases of wolves would conflict with New Mexico’s 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id.; see Humane Soc’y of the U.S., 76 F. Supp. 3d at 81 (citing Babcock, supra note 1, at 38) 
(explaining that government programs and private individuals initiated these wolf extermination ef-
forts primarily to decrease the loss of livestock to wolf predation, and that these extermination efforts 
included trapping, shooting, and poisoning of wolves, as well as digging pups out of dens). 
 55 WildEarth Guardians, 2016 WL 3919464, at *1 (citing Endangered and Threatened Wildlife 
and Plants; Revision to the Regulations for the Nonessential Experimental Population of the Mexican 
Wolf, 80 Fed. Reg. 2512). The loss of an apex predator can have a cataclysmic impact on the health of 
an entire ecosystem, disrupting food webs and setting off a phenomenon called a “trophic cascade.” 
See Thomas M. Newsome & William J. Ripple, A Continental Scale Trophic Cascade from Wolves 
Through Coyotes to Foxes, 84 J. ANIMAL ECOLOGY 49, 52 (2015). An example of this trophic cascade 
effect occurred in Yellowstone after the extirpation of wolves in the Rocky Mountains in the early 
twentieth century which caused huge elements of the ecosystem to collapse. See William J. Ripple & 
Robert L. Beschta, Trophic Cascades in Yellowstone: The First 15 Years After Wolf Reintroduction, 
145 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 205, 205–13 (2012). When wolves were returned to the park years 
later, these ecologically key areas began to regenerate, and species of animals returned. See id. Scien-
tists believe that the return of the Mexican wolves’ population to healthy levels in the Southwest 
would have a similar beneficial impact on the environment. See id.; What You Need to Know: The 
Mexican Gray Wolf, supra note 3. 
 56 Determination that Species Are Threatened and Endangered, supra note 50, at 17,740. 
 57 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1241. In 1982, the FWS created the first Mexican 
Wolf Recovery Plan, which resulted in the subspecies’ eventual reintroduction into the wild. Id. 
 58 Id. at 1243. 
 59 Id. Federal regulation requires the FWS to consult with the states and to comply with state 
permit requirements when reintroducing wildlife except when the Secretary of the Interior determines 
that such compliance prevents the completion of statutory duties under the ESA. See 43 C.F.R. 
§ 24.4(i)(5); N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1243. 
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wildlife management efforts.60 The FWS appealed the decision to the state’s 
Game Commission (“Commission”), which upheld the New Mexico Depart-
ment’s rejection of FWS’s permit applications.61 
In October 2015, the FWS and the Secretary wrote to the New Mexico 
Department, arguing that compliance with the state’s permitting requirements 
would prevent the Secretary from carrying out his responsibilities under the 
ESA.62 The FWS also believed it had independent legal authority under federal 
law to import, export, hold, and transfer wolves within the state, and to release 
wolves onto federal lands without state permits.63 Therefore, in early 2016, 
FWS issued an Initial Release and Translocation Plan and released two Mexi-
can gray wolves onto federal land within New Mexico without a state permit.64 
In response to the FWS’s wolf releases, the New Mexico Department 
filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the FWS in May 2016, and sim-
ultaneously filed a motion for preliminary injunction requesting the United 
States District Court for the District of New Mexico temporarily halt FWS’s 
further release of wolves within state borders.65 The New Mexico Department 
based its requests on three different provisions of state law that specifically 
prohibit the importation and release of non-domesticated animals, including 
Mexican gray wolves, without a permit from the New Mexico Department.66 
The New Mexico Department argued it would be harmed in two irrepara-
ble ways.67 First, it asserted the unpermitted release of wolves threatened to 
disrupt the state’s management efforts by introducing an apex predator in 
numbers not known to the state, thereby threatening the state’s wild elk and 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See N.M. CODE R. § 19.35.7.19(A)(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (indicating that to obtain a permit to 
release a non-domesticated animal, an applicant must “demonstrate that the intended release is provid-
ed for in state or federal resource or species management plans or strategies”); id. § 19.35.7.19(C) 
(stating that “[t]he director shall not approve any release permit that conflicts with current conserva-
tion management.”); N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1243–44. New Mexico’s wildlife man-
agement efforts included monitoring the state’s wild deer and elk populations, which the New Mexico 
Department of Game and Fish claimed could potentially be affected by the FWS’s release of Mexican 
gray wolves in numbers unknown to the state. N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1250. 
 61 Id. at 1244. 
 62 Id. Relevant New Mexico law provides, in pertinent part, that the FWS must comply with State 
permit requirements in reintroducing wildlife, except in instances where the Secretary of the Interior 
determines that such compliance would prevent the completion of statutory responsibilities. Id.; see 43 
C.F.R. § 24.4(i)(5)(i). 
 63 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1244. 
 64 See id. 
 65 Id. 1244–45, 1249; see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 66 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1245; see N.M. CODE R. § 19.31.10.11 (prohibiting 
release of wildlife in New Mexico without a state permit); id. § 19.35.7.8 (prohibiting importation of 
wild animals into New Mexico without a state permit); id. § 19.35.7.19 (prohibiting release of import-
ed wild animals in New Mexico without a state permit). 
 67 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1250; N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish v. U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior, No. CV 16-00462 WJ/KBM, 2016 WL 4536465, at *9 (D.N.M. June 10, 2016). 
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deer herds.68 Second, the New Mexico Department argued that the FWS’s un-
permitted releases would harm its state sovereignty interests.69 In response to 
both allegations of irreparable injury, the FWS asserted that the New Mexico 
Department could not show how the anticipated releases were likely to harm 
either its management of wild elk and deer herds or its state sovereignty.70 
FWS further contended that legal precedents reject the idea that federal actions 
concerning federally protected wildlife on federally protected land could inter-
fere with a state’s sovereignty interests.71 
The district court issued a memorandum opinion and order, determining 
the New Mexico Department was entitled to injunctive relief.72 Accordingly, 
the district court’s order enjoined the FWS from (1) importing or releasing any 
Mexican wolves in the State without first obtaining permits from the New 
Mexico Department, and (2) importing or releasing Mexican wolf offspring in 
violation of previously issued state permits.73 
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the FWS challenged the district court’s find-
ings on all four preliminary injunction factors.74 In part, the FWS contended the 
district court erred by finding that the New Mexico Department had sufficiently 
established a significant risk of irreparable injury, and therefore, that the district 
court erred in granting preliminary relief to the New Mexico Department.75 The 
Tenth Circuit held that the district court incorrectly considered only the serious-
ness of the potential irreparable harm shown, without regard for the likelihood of 
the harm.76 Thus, the Tenth Circuit determined it must review the evidence sup-
porting the New Mexico Department’s irreparable injury claims.77 
                                                                                                                           
 68 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1250; U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 2016 WL 4536465, 
at *9. An apex predator is a predator residing at the top of a food chain upon which no other animals 
prey. Apex predator, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apex%20predator [https://perma.cc/FBK8-666A]. 
 69 See N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1250. Although the New Mexico Department did 
not initially contend injury to its state sovereignty it introduced this argument on appeal. See id. Spe-
cifically, the New Mexico Department argued that the FWS’s unpermitted releases would significant-
ly interfere with New Mexico’s core government functions to establish and enforce laws within its 
borders. Id. at 1254. Additionally, the New Mexico Department contended that the FWS’s actions 
were designed to pressure New Mexico to change its laws to meet the desired goals of the FWS. Id. 
 70 Id. at 1254; U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 2016 WL 4536465, at *10. Why should FN 70 be an Id. 
at 854 if you didn’t want me to change footnote 61?  
 71 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1250. 
 72 Id. at 1245. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. Between June and July of 2016, several interested states and nonprofit organizations filed a 
motion to intervene and a notice of appeal. See id. at 1240, 1245. A notice of appeal followed shortly 
thereafter from the DOI and the FWS. See id. When this Comment discusses procedural history after 
July 2016, reference to “FWS” is intended to collectively refer to all Federal Appellants, including 
Intervenor Appellants. See id. 
 75 Id. at 1245. 
 76 See id. at 1245, 1250. 
 77 See id. 
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First, the only evidence the New Mexico Department presented to show 
harm to the state’s wildlife management efforts was a declaration by its Direc-
tor.78 The Tenth Circuit noted that the Director’s declaration did not identify or 
address the type, likelihood, imminence, or degree of harm that the anticipated 
releases or importations would allegedly have on the state’s elk and deer spe-
cies as a whole or the New Mexico Department’s ability to manage the species’ 
population.79 The Tenth Circuit therefore held that the district court had no ra-
tional basis for finding the state’s wildlife management efforts would likely 
suffer irreparable harm.80 
Second, to demonstrate harm to its state sovereignty, the New Mexico 
Department analogized its situation to one in which a state is enjoined from 
enforcing or effectuating its own statutes.81 The Tenth Circuit explicitly chose 
not to address the underlying issue of whether the state even had a valid sover-
eignty interest in creating and enforcing laws related to management of wild-
life on federal lands.82 The Tenth Circuit then noted that even assuming such 
an interest existed, the New Mexico Department presented no evidence to sup-
port its claim that the FWS’s releases would interfere with the state’s ability to 
enforce or make its own laws.83 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit held the New 
Mexico Department’s claims of harm to the state’s sovereignty were insuffi-
cient.84 Since the New Mexico Department failed to demonstrate at least one of 
the four required preliminary injunction factors, the Tenth Circuit held it was 
unnecessary to examine the other three factors, and therefore reversed and va-
cated the district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction to the New 
Mexico Department.85 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. at 1253–54. The declaration claimed this because wolves prey primarily on ungulates, 
and therefore, the predator and prey species could not be managed in isolation. Id. at 1253. 
 79 Id. at 1251. 
 80 See id. at 1254. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviews rulings by subordinate federal 
district courts for abuses of discretion. N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1245; Diné Citizens, 
839 F.3d at 1281. The Tenth Circuit held that an abuse of discretion occurs where a decision is prem-
ised on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in the evidence for the rul-
ing. N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1245; Kobach, 840 F.3d at 723. 
 81 N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1254. The New Mexico Department argued that the 
FWS’s unpermitted releases significantly interfered with the State’s ability to enforce its laws and 
therefore pressured the State to amend its laws to meet the FWS’s demands. Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See id. at 1255. In fact, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the DOI and the FWS 
were the ones enjoined from effectuating their interpretation of the ESA. See id. The Tenth Circuit 
further agreed with FWS’s argument that federal law exempted FWS from New Mexico’s permit 
requirements in the limited situation where the state’s requirements prevented FWS from executing its 
congressionally-mandated responsibility to recover the species. Id. In contrast, the New Mexico De-
partment presented no evidence to demonstrate that this limited exemption harmed New Mexico’s 
sovereignty. Id. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. at 1255, 1256. 
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II. CIRCUITS IN CONFLICT OVER PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD 
In 2008, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“Winter 
II”), the United States Supreme Court explicitly required that plaintiffs seeking 
preliminary relief demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely absent an injunc-
tion.86 Only the dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg directly addressed the 
issue of whether sliding-scale tests were still valid.87 Since the Winter II deci-
sion, courts have struggled with the questions of whether sliding-scale prelimi-
nary injunction approaches are still valid and whether the likelihood of injury 
factor should be emphasized among the other factors.88 Section A of this Part 
examines the approach taken by the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which continue to apply sliding-scale 
preliminary injunction tests and under-emphasize the likelihood of irreparable 
injury prerequisite.89 Section B details the approach taken by the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, which have interpreted 
Winter II as invalidating sliding-scale approaches, and which treat likely irrep-
arable injury as the most important prerequisite that moving parties must 
meet.90 
A. Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits: Sliding-Scale Tests Still Valid After 
Winter II and Likely Irreparable Injury Factor Not Emphasized 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Winter II, several federal cir-
cuits have continued to apply sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests that 
lessen a moving party’s burden of demonstrating one factor upon a sufficiently 
strong showing of another.91 By relaxing a movant’s burden to demonstrate a 
clear showing of all four factors independently, these federal circuits allow the 
trial judge more discretion to balance the relative strength of each factor on a 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. (Winter II), 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 
 87 See id. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that that the majority opinion does not invali-
date continued use of sliding-scale tests that lessened the requirement to show likelihood of injury 
upon the sufficient showing of a probability of success). 
 88 See id. at 22 (majority opinion) (deciding to not explicitly invalidate modified preliminary 
injunction tests, but requiring that movants clearly demonstrate the likely irreparable harm factor); 
N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 854 F.3d 1236, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that modified tests are invalid and showing likely irreparable harm is the most important 
prerequisite); All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2011) (recogniz-
ing Winter II’s requirement for movants to demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely, but holding 
that sliding-scale tests are still valid). 
 89 See infra notes 91–100 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 101–113 and accompanying text. 
 91 See All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1133–34 (applying “serious questions” test, a sub-
approach of the sliding-scale test); Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master 
Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 34–35, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that U.S. Supreme Court precedent has not 
foreclosed application of the sliding-scale approach). 
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case-by-case basis.92 In 2010, in Citigroup Global Markets v. VCG Special 
Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent supported its three-part sliding-scale test, which 
always requires movants demonstrate irreparable injury but allows the success-
on-the-merits factor to “slide.” 93 Similarly, in the 2010 case Judge v. Quinn, 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its use of a sliding-scale test, 
which provided that the greater the likelihood of success on the merits, the less 
the likelihood of irreparable harm was required to grant preliminary relief.94 
 An intra-circuit split exists within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as to 
whether sliding-scale tests are still valid after Winter II.95 In the 2010 case 
DISH Network Corp v. FCC, the Ninth Circuit applied the traditional standard 
by holding that DISH’s failure to demonstrate likely success on the merits was 
sufficient grounds for denying a preliminary injunction.96 In contrast, in 2011, 
in Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, the Ninth Circuit held that sliding-
scale tests that relaxed the need to show one factor were still valid because the 
U.S. Supreme Court did not explicitly discuss the continuing validity of slid-
ing-scale tests in Winter II.97 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the importance of 
judicial flexibility further supported its continued use of a sliding-scale ap-
proach.98After Winter II, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all recog-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134 (explaining that the flexibility of Ninth Circuit’s 
“serious questions” preliminary injunction test supported its continued application); Weisshaar, supra 
note 31, at 1040 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed a flexible approach in some cases). 
 93 See Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 598 F.3d at 34–35, 37–38. The Second Circuit held that Winter II 
did not invalidate the use of a “flexible” approach, which allows the likelihood-of-success factor to 
“slide,” or be relaxed, when there exists “serious questions going to the merits [of the case].” See id.; 
Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 1038. 
 94 See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. 
Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying a balancing 
test, reasoning that “[h]ow strong a claim on the merits is . . . depends on the balance of harms: the 
more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while 
still supporting some preliminary relief”). 
 95 Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 1040; see Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; DISH Network Corp. v. FCC, 
653 F.3d 771, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the traditional four-factor test); All. for the Wild Rock-
ies, 632 F.3d at 1131–32 (applying the “serious questions” sub-approach) 
 96 DISH Network, 653 F.3d at 776 (requiring the movant to meet all four elements of the prelimi-
nary injunction test). 
 97 See All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131–32. The Ninth Circuit held that its “serious 
questions” approach survived Winter II, and that serious questions going to the merits and a hardship 
balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff could support the issuance of an injunction, assuming 
that the other two elements of the Winter II test are also met. Id. In other words, this test ignored the 
requirement for movants to demonstrate likely success on the merits. See id.; see also Winter II, 555 
U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority did not discuss the validity of modified 
tests so courts should consider flexible sliding-scale approaches as still valid). 
 98 See All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1133–34. At times, the Ninth Circuit even applies a 
“serious questions” sub-approach to its modified test, completely ignoring the requirement to show a 
likelihood of success when serious questions exist going to the merits of the case, and the other two 
elements tip in the movant’s favor. See id. at 1131–32. 
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nized the requirement for irreparable injury to be likely, and not merely possi-
ble.99 Nonetheless, these circuits have refused to place a heightened burden 
on the likely irreparable injury prerequisite, treating it instead with equal 
or less weight than the other three factors.100 
B. Fourth and Tenth Circuits: Sliding-Scale Tests Invalidated; Likely 
Irreparable Injury Factor Emphasized 
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have both repeatedly affirmed interpreta-
tions of Winter II as requiring a traditional, sequential test, invalidating any 
approach that relaxes or ignores any of the four requirements.101 In the 2009 
case The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, the 
Fourth Circuit held that Winter II invalidated its previously-applied modified 
preliminary injunction test that did not require a clear showing of the likeli-
hood of success factor.102 The Fourth Circuit held that Winter II required that a 
moving party make a sufficiently clear showing on each of the four traditional 
factors.103 
In Diné Citizens Against Ruining our Environment v. Jewell, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2009 that any modified preliminary injunction 
 99 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (recognizing that 
irreparable harm must be likely, not merely possible, to warrant preliminary relief); Quinn, 612 F.3d 
at 546 (requiring movant demonstrate likely irreparable harm, but also holding that factors are inter-
dependent); Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 598 F.3d at 33 (acknowledging movant’s requirement to demon-
strate likelihood of irreparable harm). 
 100 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131; Quinn, 612 F.3d at 
546; Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 598 F.3d at 33. For example, in Alliance for the Wild Rockies, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that a possibility of irreparable harm was no longer sufficient 
to grant preliminary relief after Winter II, but still placed less weight on the likelihood of harm factor 
than the it placed on the other three factors. See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; All. for the Wild Rockies, 
632 F.3d at 1131. 
 101 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 
1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that any preliminary injunction test that is modified to relax one 
of the prongs is invalidated after Winter II); Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 
(4th Cir. 2011) (requiring a sequential test that considers each factor on its own); Scott v. Bierman, 
429 F. App’x 225, 228–29 (4th Cir. 2011) (requiring sequential test); Real Truth About Obama, Inc. 
v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding previously applied sliding-scale approaches as
invalid); WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 
2009) (requiring a sequential test). The term “sequential” denotes a test in which each factor is exam-
ined in sequence, independent of the strength of the other factors. See Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 
1016 (explaining that a sequential test is one that requires a movant to demonstrate all four factors of 
the traditional test). 
 102 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; Real Truth About Obama, 575 F.3d at 346, 347 (holding that 
Winter II invalidated the Fourth Circuit’s previously-applied “Blackwelder” test, which instructed that 
the likelihood of success requirement can only be reviewed after purported hardships are balanced, 
which itself requires a satisfactory showing of questions appropriate for litigation); Weisshaar, supra 
note 31, at 1033. 
 103 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; Real Truth About Obama, 575 F.3d at 346; Weisshaar, supra 
note 31, at 1034. 
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test that relaxes one of the prongs of the traditional test is no longer valid after 
Winter II.104In Diné Citizens, the plaintiffs argued that sliding-scale tests were 
still valid because the U.S. Supreme Court never expressly rejected them in 
Winter II and because the invalidated Ninth Circuit standard dealt with a dif-
ferent prong of the preliminary injunction test.105 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, 
holding that Winter II’s rationale applied with equal force even though a differ-
ent prong of the preliminary injunction test was relaxed.106 The court thus sug-
gested that the intent of Winter II was to require movants demonstrate that all 
four factors independently and sufficiently exist.107 Additionally, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s own subsequent treatment of preliminary injunction tests after 
Winter II further suggests that the Court requires a sequential test that consid-
ers all four of the preliminary injunction factors on an independent basis.108 
Nevertheless, the Court has not defined which standard of proof applies to 
demonstrate that each factor is sufficiently met.109 
In the 2004 case Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite 
Corp., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that demonstrating likely irrep-
                                                                                                                           
 104 Diné Citizens, 839 F.3d at 1287 (concluding that its modified test is inconsistent with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Winter II, which held that any modified test which relaxes one of 
the prongs for preliminary relief, thus deviating from the standard test, is impermissible); see N.M. 
Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246; see also Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Herbert, 839 
F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (rec-
ognizing that although the Tenth Circuit “once suggested that the plaintiff’s burden on the likelihood 
of success factor may be relaxed when the other preliminary injunction factors are satisfied . . . . the 
Supreme Court has since cast doubt on that judgment”). 
 105 See Diné Citizens, 839 F.3d at 1282. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See id. 
 108 Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 1050–51; see Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 
139, 157, 158 (2010) (citing Winter II to hold that an injunction should issue only if the traditional 
four-factor test is satisfied); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (re-
jecting sliding-scale tests and stating that courts could not disperse with the required showing of one 
factor because there is a strong likelihood of another). 
 109 See Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 1053 (arguing that although precise quantification of proba-
bilities in any given case is difficult, this should not prevent the Supreme Court from enunciating a 
clear standard). For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has never elaborated on whether “a clear show-
ing of likelihood” of irreparable injury is intended to require that likelihood of harm be proved “be-
yond a reasonable doubt,” “by clear and convincing evidence,” “by a preponderance of the evidence,” 
or by some other standard of proof. Id.; see also Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary In-
junction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 532 (2003) (arguing that a party 
seeking a preliminary injunction should be required to prove at least a fifty-percent chance of prevail-
ing on the merits). “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is the standard of proof that requires the factfinder 
(judge or jury) to be firmly convinced of a criminal defendant’s guilt. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “Clear and convincing evidence” is the standard of proof 
that requires a factfinder to determine that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably 
certain. Clear and Convincing Evidence, id. The lowest burden of the three standards of proof, “pre-
ponderance of the evidence” is defined as the burden of proof in most civil trials, in which the jury is 
instructed to find for the party that has the stronger evidence on the whole, however slight the party’s 
edge. Preponderance of the Evidence, id. 
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arable harm was the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction.110 The Tenth Circuit’s heightened burden on the likeli-
hood of irreparable harm factor was later supported by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in Winter II.111 The Court’s primary legacy in Winter II was its 
mandate that a movant must demonstrate a likelihood, not merely a possibility, 
of irreparable harm absent preliminary relief.112 Nevertheless, the Court also 
suggested the relative importance of the likelihood of harm factor among the 
other three factors by indicating that likely harm must be demonstrated before 
a decision on the merits could be rendered.113 
III. WINTER II HOLDING INVALIDATES SLIDING-SCALE TESTS AND 
REQUIRES EMPHASIS OF LIKELY IRREPARABLE INJURY  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 2017 decision 
in New Mexico Department of Game & Fish v. United States Department of the 
Interior correctly held that sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests, which 
relax the requirement to show any factor below the clear showing standard, are 
no longer valid after the United States Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Win-
ter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“Winter II”).114 Further, the 
Tenth Circuit correctly suggested that the requirement to demonstrate likely 
irreparable injury should be emphasized because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
intent to treat preliminary relief as an extraordinary remedy available only in 
situations in which irreparable harm is likely to occur.115 This Part argues that 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2017 holding in New Mexico Department 
of Game & Fish correctly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision 
in Winter II as invalidating sliding-scale tests.116 Additionally, this Part sug-
gests that the other federal circuits should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 
2004); see also Port City Props. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 518 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008) (reiter-
ating the Tenth Circuit’s emphasis on likely irreparable harm as the most important factor). 
 111 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1249–50 (citing Winter 
II’s holding that a movant must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely absent an injunction). 
 112 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1249–50 (citing Winter 
II’s holding that movant must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely absent injunction); WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 28, § 2948.1, at 139 (noting that the primary lesson from Winter II was its require-
ment that movants demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm, not merely a possibility of such 
harm). 
 113 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 2948.1, at 139). 
 114 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. (Winter II), 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); N.M. Dep’t of 
Game & Fish v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 854 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 115 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (holding that issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a 
possibility of irreparable harm as inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s characterization of in-
junctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 
plaintiff is entitled to such relief); N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1253. 
 116 See infra notes 118–125 and accompanying text. 
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of placing a heightened emphasis on the likelihood of irreparable harm fac-
tor.117  
Following Winter II, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed 
that all four elements must be clearly and independently demonstrated to war-
rant preliminary relief.118 This standard suggests that relaxing the burden to 
show any one of the prongs of the traditional test would not lead to a clear 
showing of all four factors.119 Therefore, sliding-scale tests that do not require 
a clear showing of all factors independently, but instead balance the relative 
strength of the factors, are no longer valid after Winter II.120 
The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits should reconsider their contin-
ued use of sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests for three reasons.121 First, 
the natural reading of the Winter II holding expresses the four traditional fac-
tors in a list format, with semicolons and the conjunction “and” joining the 
factors, indicating that all elements are equally required.122 Second, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s own interpretations of Winter II suggest that Winter II’s pre-
liminary injunction standard requires a sequential test wherein movants must 
demonstrate all four factors by a clear and independent showing.123 Finally, the 
traditional, sequential test that requires an independent showing of each factor 
is fairer than a balancing test.124 Although the latter provides flexibility for 
federal district court judges, it significantly disadvantages non-movants by al-
lowing preliminary relief even in cases where movants have very little chance 
of later succeeding on the merits at trial.125 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See infra notes 126–133 and accompanying text. 
 118 See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (requiring clear showing of all four preliminary 
injunction factors); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 157–58 (2010) (holding that 
all four factors were required to warrant an injunction); Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22. 
 119 See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, 
§ 2948.1, at 195. 
 120 See N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246; Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t 
v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016); Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 121 See Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 1048 (providing similar reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court 
should adopt a sequential test, but arguing further that the Court should adopt a modified “likely-
success-on-the-merits” test that emphasizes that factor as most important). 
 122 Id. at 1049. The sentence format of different factors joined by semicolons and the word “and” 
generally indicates that all the elements in the list are required. See id. (explaining that this sentence 
format indicates a sequential test in which all four traditional factors are required). 
 123 Id.; see Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. at 157–58 (holding that the traditional four-factor test applies 
when a plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to remedy a NEPA violation); Nken, 556 U.S. at 433 
(requiring a movant to demonstrate all four traditional factors to warrant preliminary relief); Munaf v. 
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008) (holding that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demon-
strate the other three factors, and not only the “likelihood of success on the merits” factor). 
 124 Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 1052. 
 125 See id.; Denlow, supra note 109, at 532 (arguing that sliding-scale tests should not be used 
because they allow parties with little chance of ultimately prevailing on the merits to obtain prelimi-
nary injunctions, thus manipulating the judicial process and wasting valuable and limited court time). 
42 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
The Tenth Circuit’s heightened emphasis on the likelihood of irreparable 
harm factor in New Mexico Department of Game & Fish is consistent with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary 
remedy in Winter II.126 The Tenth Circuit’s emphasis on this factor reflects the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s intent that a plaintiff’s right to relief must be clear and 
unequivocal, especially because preliminary injunctions often provide the 
plaintiff with the ultimate remedy sought from the trial itself.127 Although the 
Ninth Circuit now requires a clear showing of all four preliminary injunction 
factors since Winter II, it should place a heightened emphasis on the likelihood 
of harm requirement.128 The Tenth Circuit’s standard, which requires demon-
strating likely irreparable harm before considering the other factors, is more 
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s intent in Winter II because it proper-
ly treats a preliminary injunction as an extreme measure necessary to avoid 
almost certain irreparable harm that would otherwise occur absent relief.129 
The conflict among the federal circuits over the preliminary injunction 
standard should be resolved by the other circuits adopting the Tenth Circuit’s 
stricter, sequential approach.130 The Tenth Circuit’s approach requires all four 
factors independently meet a “clear showing” baseline burden of proof but also 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (holding that a plaintiff’s right to preliminary relief must be clear 
and unequivocal); N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1249 (holding that a preliminary injunc-
tion is an extraordinary remedy that requires a movant to demonstrate a clear showing of all four tradi-
tional factors). 
 127 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1250, 1253; 
Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 1057. 
 128 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 129 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22. Compare N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1250 (citing 
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003)) (holding that, while not 
an easy burden to meet, a plaintiff who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demon-
strated that the harm is not speculative), with Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 
205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (requiring all four traditional factors, but under-emphasizing the relative im-
portance of likelihood of irreparable harm in the issuance of a preliminary injunction), and All. for the 
Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (requiring that movants demonstrate likely irreparable injury, but 
omitting any discussion on the relative importance of the likely harm factor in relation to the other 
three factors). 
 130 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22 (holding that movants for preliminary injunctions must demon-
strate all four traditional preliminary injunction factors, including likelihood of irreparable injury 
absent immediate preliminary relief); Ferring Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d at 210 (requiring all four factors 
be demonstrated to warrant preliminary relief in the Third Circuit, but not discussing the relative im-
portance of the likely irreparable harm factor among the other three factors). Compare N.M. Dep’t of 
Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1246–47, 1249 (requiring that movants demonstrate at least a clear showing 
of all four traditional factors, but also placing a heightened emphasis on the demonstration of likely 
irreparable injury), and Diné Citizens, 839 F.3d at 1282 (holding that the Tenth Circuit’s previously-
applied sliding-scale test was inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s intent in Winter II), with All. 
for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131–32 (holding that the Ninth Circuit’s use of sliding-scale tests 
was still valid after Winter II because the U.S. Supreme Court never expressly rejected sliding-scale 
tests). 
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allows courts to apply heightened burdens for movants to demonstrate any of 
the four factors, such as to the likely irreparable injury element.131 This base-
line approach is similar to the type of “floor” requirements established by the 
U.S. Supreme Court for other types of procedural safeguards.132 Further, it is 
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s intent for preliminary injunctions to 
serve as extraordinary remedies granted only upon a clear showing that that the 
movant is entitled to such relief.133 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court should clarify its preliminary injunction 
standard by rejecting sliding-scale tests, defining the burdens of proof required 
for the four factors, and further emphasizing the likely injury requirement.134 
Such a resolution would promote the interests of the justice system by ensuring 
fairness for all parties and consistency among the courts, thereby discouraging 
frivolous litigation and forum-shopping.135 
CONCLUSION 
In New Mexico Department of Game & Fish v. United States Department 
of the Interior, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cor-
rectly held that the United States Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. invalidated continued use of sliding-
scale preliminary injunction tests that unfairly permit preliminary relief with-
out a sufficient and independent showing of all four required elements. Addi-
tionally, the court held that likely irreparable injury is the most important pre-
requisite to grant a preliminary injunction. The decision in New Mexico De-
partment of Game & Fish was a victory for federal efforts to conserve endan-
gered species, especially in future cases involving states’ attempts to control 
wildlife on federal land within their borders. Within the Tenth Circuit, states 
may no longer preliminarily enjoin federal agencies from conserving endan-
                                                                                                                           
 131 See N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1245, 1253. 
 132 See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 86 (1980); N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 
854 F.3d at 1245, 1253. In PruneYard Shopping Center, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state’s 
constitutional provision that required private property owners to allow others to express their First 
Amendment free speech rights on their property in certain situations did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 86. The Court explained that state constitutions could pro-
vide individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution. See id. at 
81. Similarly, regarding grants of preliminary injunctions, movants in federal courts are required to 
demonstrate a baseline clear showing of all four factors, but specific jurisdictions should be permitted 
to require heightened burdens for certain factors. See id. 
 133 See Winter II, 555 U.S. at 22; N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1245, 1253. 
 134 See Denlow, supra note 109, at 538 (contending that courts should require parties moving for 
a preliminary injunction to demonstrate an at least fifty percent likelihood of succeeding on the merits, 
because allowing any less likelihood manipulates the judicial process by allowing injunction when 
success at trial is unlikely). 
 135 See N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 854 F.3d at 1253; Weisshaar, supra note 31, at 1015; 
Denlow, supra note 109, at 538. 
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gered species in the absence of a clear showing of likely irreparable harm. 
Nevertheless, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits continue to apply more 
relaxed sliding-scale approaches that ignore one or more factors by balancing 
the relative strengths of each factor on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, it is 
likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will need to address this circuit split and 
clarify its preliminary injunction standard. When that happens, the Court 
should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach and establish a preliminary injunc-
tion standard consistent with its own extensive precedent, prohibiting contin-
ued use of sliding-scale tests and emphasizing likely irreparable harm as the 
most important prerequisite. For now, at least, where states cannot show likely 
irreparable injury, state agencies seeking preliminary relief are simply crying 
wolf. 
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